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LESLIE SALT CO. V. UNITED STATES: KEEP THE BIRDS
OUT OF YOUR BIRDBATH: IT MAY BE CONSIDERED THE
JURISDICTION OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AS
A "WATER OF THE UNITED STATES"
I. INTRODUCTION
In Leslie Salt Co. v. United States (Leslie H),l the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Army Corps
of Engineer's (Corps)2 jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act
(CWA)3 extended to both property made aquatic in part by gov-
ernment action and to man-made temporary water formations
whose connection with interstate commerce is based on their po-
tential as habitats for migratory birds and endangered species.4
At issue was the scope of Corps jurisdiction over two distinct
parcels of privately owned intrastate property: (1) land that exhib-
ited wetland characteristics caused in part by government actions
which allowed water from neighboring properties to flow through
the land; and (2) artificially created ponds and pits that temporar-
ily held rainwater for a portion of the year, but were not hydro-
logically connected 5 to any other body of water.6 Both issues
involved Corps regulations interpreting the scope of Corps juris-
diction conferred by Congress under the CWA. 7
1. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1089
(1991). Throughout this Note the Ninth Circuit decision will be referred to as
"Leslie H." The district court's "Leslie I" decision, Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States, 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990),
was reversed by the appellate court in Leslie II.
2. For a discussion of the Corps' role under the Clean Water Act, see infra
notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982 & Supp. 1986) (Act was formally titled Federal Water Pollution Control
Act but is now commonly referred to as Clean Water Act)) [hereinafter CWA].
4. Leslie H, 896 F.2d 354.
5. Throughout this Note cases and analysis will be distinguished by waters
that are hydrologically or non-hydrologically connected. Hydrology is "[t]he
scientific study of the properties, distribution, and effects of water on the earth's
surface, in the soil and underlying rocks, and in the atmosphere." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 630 (2d College ed. 1982). The term "hydro-
logically connected," as used in this Note, will refer to the circulation of water
from one location to another by means other than rainfall.
6. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 355-57.
7. The congressional power to regulate pollution in bodies of water is
based on its power under the commerce clause of the Constitution. See infra
(463)
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The appellate court determined that how a body of water was
formed is irrelevant to the issue of Corps jurisdiction.8 Perhaps
more notably, the court decided that Congress meant to extend
the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA to the full extent of con-
gressional commerce clause power, and that Corps jurisdiction
includes artificially created intrastate bodies of water with no hy-
drological connection to any other body of water.9 Because the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the Corps' broad interpretation of its juris-
diction under the CWA,10 practically any body of water in the
United States could now arguably be considered under the juris-
diction of the Corps and require a permit before it is filled."'
The Leslie H decision is significant because it is a clear victory
for environmental groups interested in protecting wetlands and
notes 16-23 and accompanying text. Congress intended the CWA to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of then nations' wa-
ters." CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). In section 404 of the CWA, Congress
gave the Corps the power to regulate the discharge of fill material into navigable
waters. For a discussion of the Corps' definition of fill material, see infra notes
33-34 and accompanying text. Under section 502(7) of the CWA,. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7), Congress defined "navigable waters" to mean the "waters of the
United States" but did not define the term "waters of the United States." See
CWA § 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. The Corps has defined the term "wa-
ters of the United States" broadly as applied to its jurisdictional limits under the
CWA. See Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1990).
For text and discussion of the Corps's definition of "waters of the United
States," see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
8. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 358.
9. Id. at 360. For a definition of "hydrologically connected" and its signifi-
cance in this Note, see supra note 5.
10. The Corps has interpreted its jurisdiction to include waters whose de-
struction would affect interstate commerce. Definition of Waters of the United
States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (1990). These waters include those used by in-
terstate recreational travelers, waters providing fish sold in interstate commerce,
or waters providing present or former use for industrial purposes by industries
in interstate commerce. Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (1990). The Corps would also include waters whose sole connec-
tion to interstate commerce is their use by migratory birds as a habitat. Final
Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (1986). For a discussion of regulations promulgated by the Corps defin-
ing its jurisdiction, see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
11. The district court in Leslie 1, 700 F. Supp. 476, had concluded that
(1) land does not become a "water of the United States just because water col-
lects, ponds, and stands on the land for a few days after a rain" and (2) land does
not become "a water of the United States simply because water drains off of the
land and ultimately . . . flows into waters of the United States." Id. at 483-84.
The district court contended that if the previous criteria were used as the test
then any land subject to enough rainfall to collect standing water or any land
located at a higher elevation than a "water of the United States," where water
eventually drained off it into the lower "water" would itself become "waters of
the United States." Id. at 484 (emphasis added). By reversing the district court,
the Ninth Circuit has, if the district court contention is correct, made any body
of water a potential "water of the United States" subject to Corps jurisdiction.
2
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other bodies of water that support ecological life.' 2 The ruling is
a defeat for land development groups who may now face poten-
tially insurmountable obstacles in developing certain lands for
residential or commercial use.' 3 Before the ruling, land develop-
ers felt that Corps jurisdiction was too broad. 14 After Leslie II, the
uncertainty of permit requirements and the consistency (or arbi-
trariness) of Corps enforcement will have an increasing impact on
both the property uses and business practices of developers, land
owners, and farmers.' 5
12. An attorney for the Save San Francisco Bay Association, which had ap-
pealed the district court ruling along with the Corps, said "[t]his is a 100 percent
victory for us and is really important to protect California's wetlands." The San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 7, 1990, § A, at 2. In contrast, a Leslie Salt Co. attor-
ney stated "from our perspective, it was not a good decision." Id.
13. The tension between environmentalists and developers is illustrated by
the conflict between preserving lands for the protection of endangered species
and migratory birds, and the jobs and revenue produced by commercial devel-
opment. For example, Hayward, California was the sight of a proposed 687 acre
industrial park and race track, near the land in controversy in Leslie H. The de-
velopment would have provided up to 16,000 jobs and raised $16 million in
revenue at the expense of land that was home to rare species and migratory
birds. Hayward Mayor, Alex Giuliani, a supporter of the development, said
"[d]o we want to feed birds or feed people?" United Press International wire
release, March 18, 1987 (NEXIS, Omni Library).
14. In 1985 the Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985), interpreted Corps jurisdiction to include waters
adjacent to "waters of the United States" but, unlike the Leslie II court, did not
reach the question of waters not adjacent to waters of the United States. Id. at
461 n.8, (emphasis added). Even so, "[t]he U.S. Chamber of Commerce had
called the government's expansive interpretation of the Clean Water Act 'a clas-
sic example of federal regulatory overreaching,' saying many development plans
were being ruined by the Corps' assertion of authority even when they posed no
threat to water quality." Los Angeles Times, Dec. 5, 1985, § 1, at 14, col. 1. An
attorney who supported the developers commented, "[tihe permit process is a
very costly, time-consuming and aggravating process." Id.
15. The Corps has broad powers to regulate land development and farming
in a manner that may not have been contemplated by Congress. For example,
the Corps defines wetlands, in part, as "areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support...
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Definition of
Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)(b) (1990). But the Corps
has considered land inundated or saturated for as little as one week per year to
be wetlands subject to its jurisdiction. Nat'l L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 19. Other
examples of wetlands under the regulations include "a North Dakota cornfield
where pools of water collect for a week each year during normal spring runoff; a
muddy patch between railroad tracks in the center of an Idaho town; irrigation
ditches dug by farmers in the West-some of which have been in use since
1900." N.Y. Times, April 3, 1991, § A, at 21, col 1 (Is California 40 Percent
Wetlands?).
The Corps has used its jurisdiction over bodies of water it considers wet-
lands to "stop the construction of refineries, interstate power lines, highways
and shopping centers . . . [u]nlike many other environmental laws that require a
facility or project to attain a certain level of pollution control, wetlands regula-
4651991]
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This Note first considers the development of the Corps' juris-
diction over "waters of the United States" from the Corps' origi-
nal conception of its authority under the CWA, through court
decisions interpreting its jurisdiction prior to the Leslie II case.
This Note will then examine the decision in Leslie II, and analyze
its reasoning and impact.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERM
"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES"
A. Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause to
Regulate Waters
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 16 This grant of
power, known as the "commerce clause," is the basis for congres-
sional jurisdiction over all waters of the United States deemed to
have a connection with interstate commerce. 17 Interstate com-
merce has been interpreted broadly; the Congress may even regu-
late activities that are considered purely local.' 8 If Congress has a
reasonable basis for concluding that interstate commerce is af-
fected, the courts will treat its definition with deference.' 9
tion determines whether the project will be built in the first place." Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 13, 1989, at 19.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. A statute based on congressional power under the commerce clause will
be upheld if (l) the general activity sought to be upheld is reasonably related to,
or has an effect on, interstate commerce and (2) the specific activity in contro-
versy was intended to be reached by Congress through the statute. Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18. "Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also in-
cludes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities
in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and
harmful effect upon that commerce." Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; see
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (commerce
power of Congress is plenary and extends to intrastate local activities affecting
interstate commerce). "[E]ven if ... activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irre-
spective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'" Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
As long as a class of acts might reasonably have a significant aggregate economic
effect nationally, it is irrelevant if an individual's act in that class is trivial. See Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300-01; Wick-
ard, 317 U.S. at 127-28. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 236-
37 (1978).
19. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) ("a wide
[Vol. II: p. 463
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Water pollution is regarded as seriously affecting interstate
commerce, and thus, Congress has the power under the com-
merce clause to regulate activities that cause such pollution. 20
Courts have broadly defined the prerequisite interstate commerce
activities affected by water pollution, recognizing that water pol-
lution impacts interstate commerce by endangering agriculture,
ending public enjoyment of rivers and lakes and threatening navi-
gation. 2' Congress may constitutionally regulate bodies of water
which are non-navigable and by themselves do not affect inter-
state commerce other than recreationally or agriculturally. 22
Moreover, challenges to government jurisdiction over intrastate
animals or bodies of water, based on a claim that Congress lacks
power under the commerce clause, have generally failed. 23
spectrum of economic activities 'affect' interstate commerce and thus are suscep-
tible of congressional regulation under the commerce clause irrespective of
whether navigation, or, indeed, water is involved"); see also United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937). For a further list of authorities supporting this deferential treatment of
congressional power when exercised under the commerce clause, see supra note
18.
20. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (dumping
of pollutants into canals flowing into arm of Tampa Bay was type of activity
Congress intended to regulate under CWA). The Holland court was one of the
first to take judicial notice of the effects of water pollution outside of navigable
waters. "Congress and the courts have become aware of the lethal effect pollu-
tion has on all organisms. Weakening any of the life support systems bodes
disaster for the rest of the interrelated life forms. To recognize this and yet hold
that pollution does not affect interstate commerce.., would be contrary to rea-
son." Id. at 673.
21. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir.
1974). The court noted the effect water pollution has on interstate commerce;
polluted water is unfit for agricultural irrigation, and polluted rivers and lakes
are unfit for swimming, boating and fishing. The court also took judicial notice
that two rivers in the Fourth Circuit were so polluted with flammable materials
that they had repeatedly caught fire. Id. at 1325-26.
22. Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 802-04 (10th Cir. 1984). In Marsh, the
State of Utah, through its Division of Parks and Recreation, contended that the
Corps had no jurisdiction over a lake with no navigable tributary or outlet be-
yond the state border. Id. at 801. The State argued these characteristics caused
the lake to be beyond the constitutional reach of the regulatory authority of
Congress. Id. The State did not controvert evidence presented by the Corps
that the lake affected interstate commerce because it was used by interstate trav-
elers and that water from it was used to grow crops sold in interstate commerce.
Id. The State considered this evidence irrelevant to the constitutional question.
Id. The Marsh court held that discharge of fill material into the lake could effect
interstate commerce as defined by the Corps and thus the court supported the
Corps' claim of jurisdiction. Id. at 803.
23. See Marsh, 740 F.2d at 803; United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-
11 (7th Cir. 1979) (Congress may constitutionally extend its regulatory control
of navigable waters under commerce clause to wetlands which adjoin or are con-
tiguous to intrastate lakes used by interstate travelers for water related recrea-
tional purposes); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F.
5
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B. Congressional Enactment of the Clean Water Act
The CWA was enacted following a congressional finding that
national efforts to control water pollution were inadequate. 24
Congress enacted the CWA in order "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."' 25 The word "integrity" refers to a condition in which the
natural functions of ecosystems are maintained. 26
In order to achieve its far-reaching goal of restoring and
maintaining the nation's waters, Congress decreed in the CWA
that "the discharge of any pollutant [into navigable waters27] by
any person shall be unlawful." 28 Persons can escape liability only
by complying with certain other sections of the CWA. 29 Pollution
is defined by the Act as "the man-made or man-induced alteration
of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of
water." 30 Congress broadly defined pollutants to include wastes,
heat, and discarded sand.31
Supp. 985, 991-95 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Congress
may enforce Endangered Species Act on behalf of entirely intrastate animal be-
cause of possibilities of interstate commerce in species and interstate movement
of persons who come to observe the species); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979) (state statute prohibiting out-of-state shipment of certain intra-
state fish must yield to federal commerce power).
24. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3668, 3674, and in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 1415, 1425 (1972). See also
Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. V. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979).
25. CWA § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
26. S. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 753,
763-64 (1972); See Minehaha Creek, 597 F.2d at 625. The House Committee on
Public Works also stated that "[a]ny change induced by man which overtaxes the
ability of nature to restore conditions to 'natural' or 'original' is an unacceptable
perpetuation." Id.
27. For a discussion of the term "navigable waters," see infra notes 37-43
and accompanying text.
28. CWA § 301(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
29. United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 947-48
(W.D. Tenn. 1976) (section 301(a) of CWA; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), imposes abso-
lute prohibition on discharge from point source of pollutants into any water of
United States by any person unless such discharge is in compliance with certain
CWA sections including §§ 301, 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404). The court
considered a city sewer system as discharging a pollutant into a navigable water
as defined by CWA section 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), but did not base its
definition on the section of the CWA that the city had failed to comply with. Id.
at 948. It might be assumed, therefore, that the definition of a "water of the
United States" under section 502(7) is not dependent on which provision of the
CWA is being enforced. For a further discussion of Velsicol, see infra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
30. CWA § 502(19), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19).
31. CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
6
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C. Inaugural Corps Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act of
"Waters of the United States"
Congress provided the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers with a role in administering the CWA.3 2 Section 404 of the
CWA requires that those wishing to put dredged or fill material 3
into the "navigable waters" must obtain permits from the
Corps.34 The permit program's purpose is to prevent "(1) the
destruction and degradation of aquatic resources that results
from replacing water with dredged material or fill material; and
(2) the contamination of water resources with dredged or fill ma-
terial that contains toxic substances."3 5 The criteria for denying a
permit include those where "the discharge of such materials into
such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, . . .wildlife, or
recreational areas." 3 6
The CWA defines "navigable waters" to mean "the waters of
32. For a history of the Corps' involvement in the CWA, see Caplin, Is Con-
gress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Water Pollution
Control Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445 (1977); Note, National Wild-
life Federation v. Hanson: Content-based Review of Corps Wetlands Determination Under
the Citizens' Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act, 67 N.C.L. REV. 695 (1989).
33. The Corps accused Leslie Salt Co. of discharging fill into "waters of the
United States" in violation of the CWA. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 356.
The Corps' original definition of dredged material stated that "[d]redged
material means material that is excavated or dredged from navigable waters...
[but] does not include material resulting from normal farming, silvaculture, and
ranching activities." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(4) (1976). The Corps later updated
this definition, stating that dredged material is "material excavated or dredged
from waters of the United States." Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill
Material into Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1987).
The Corps' original definition of fill material stated the following:
Fill material ... means any pollutant used to create fill in the traditional
sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bot-
tom elevation of a water body ... [but] does not include . . .[m]aterial
resulting from normal farming . . . [or] [miaterial placed for the pur-
pose of maintenance or emergency repair of existing fills 'such as dikes,
dams, levees .... causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches.
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(6) (1976).
For a discussion of the meaning of "fill material" under the CWA, see
Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 624-27 (8th Cir.
1979).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). "The Secretary [of the Army, acting through the
Corps of Engineers] may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings, for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
at specified disposal sites." Id.
35. S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4326, 4399-4400.
36. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
1991] 469
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the United States."'3 7 But Congress never defined the term "wa-
ters of the United States" as it applies to the limits of the Corps'
jurisdictional authority,3 8 and reliance on the definition of "navi-
gable waters" is unhelpful because it fails to provide any defini-
tion for the term "waters of the United States."13 9 The term
"navigable waters" was used by Congress as a jurisdictional term
limiting the scope of Corps regulation beginning with the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.40 Relying on the defini-
tion in that Act, the Corps defined "navigable waters" as applying
only to waters used for the transport of interstate commerce or
foreign commerce. 4 '
Despite Congress defining Corps jurisdiction as limited to
"navigable waters," it is clear from the legislative history that
Congress intended the CWA to cover waters beyond the Corps'
established test of navigability. 4 2 In its report on the original
37. Id. § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). "The term 'navigable waters' means
the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." Id.
38. See CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
39. It is possible that Congress used the term "navigable" to invoke the
notion of "navigational servitude" and thereby avoid compensating property
owners who are adversely affected by the CWA. The Supreme Court has stated
that "[w]hen the 'taking' question has involved the exercise of the public right of
navigation over interstate waters that constitute highways for commerce, how-
ever, this Court has held in many cases that compensation may not be required
as a result of the federal navigational servitude." Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S.
53 (1913)).
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that a landowners remedy for
harm caused by the Corps' claim ofjurisdiction under the CWA is to seek dam-
ages through inverse condemnation proceedings. United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985); see generally First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); infra
note 152.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). Under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403, it was illegal to fill, excavate, alter, or modify the course or
condition of waters within the boundaries of a navigable waterway without au-
thorization from the Corps. Rivers and Harbors Act § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403.
Under section 13, one was prohibited from the deposit of refuse in or on the
bank of a navigable waterway without a Corps permit. Id. § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407.
41. The Corps still defines "navigable waters" as "those waters that are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been
used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign
commerce." Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R.
§ 329.4 (1990). However, the Corp stated, in the purpose section of the regula-
tion, that this definition does not apply to authorities [regulations promulgated]
under the CWA. Id. § 329.1.
42. The joint House and Senate Conference Committee stated that: "[t]he
conferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations
which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes." S. REP.
8
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Senate bill, the Senate Public Works Committee considered the
hydrological movement of water to be a key reason for broadening
the jurisdiction of waters covered by the CWA: "[w]ater moves in
hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be
controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to the control re-
quirements [of the CWA] must be made to the navigable waters,
portions thereof, and their tributaries." 43
One of the first cases that expanded Corps jurisdiction over
"waters of the United States" beyond its established "navigable
waters" definition was United States v. Holland.44 The Holland court
held that Congress did not intend Corps jurisdiction under the
CWA to be limited to the historical meaning of "navigable wa-
ters," as the concept of "navigable" in 1899 was based on Com-
merce power over transport commerce. 45  The Holland court
defined water pollution, in addition to transport, as an activity
affecting interstate commerce for purposes of the commerce
clause, and thus, the Corps was not confined to its traditional def-
inition of "navigable water."'46 In the years following the enact-
ment of the CWA, there has been general agreement by the
judiciary that Congress gave the Corps broad powers to regulate
waters not considered navigable. 47
No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3668, 3822.
43. S. REP. No. 92-414, 77, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1972, 3668, 3742-43. Representative Dingell, in commenting
on the Committee's term "navigable waters," emphasized the overall hydrologi-
cal nature of the waters to be protected, as opposed to mere navigability:
Third, the conference bill defines the term "navigable waters" broadly
for water quality purposes. It means all "the waters of the United
States" in a geographical sense. It does not mean "navigable waters of
the United States" in the technical sense as we sometimes see in some
laws .... Thus, the new definition clearly encompasses all water bod-
ies, including main streams and their tributaries, for water quality pur-
poses. No longer are the old narrow definitions of navigability, as
determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters cov-
ered by this bill.
118 Cong. Rec. 9124-25 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
44. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
45. Id. at 669.
46. Id. at 671. For a discussion of the broad interpretation of congressional
power under the commerce clause, see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text.
47. Even before the Supreme Court addressed the issue of Corps jurisdic-
tion under the CWA in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985), at least one commentator noted agreement throughout the federal
courts that Corps jurisdiction was not limited to traditional navigable waters.
Note, Significant Development: The Clean Water Act - More Section 404: The Supreme
Court Gets its Feet Wet. 65 B.U.L. REV. 995, 1006-07 n.92 (1985). The commenta-
9
Lessner: Leslie Salt Co. v. United States: Keep the Birds out of Your Bird
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
472 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II: p. 463
D. Corps Regulations Defining "Waters of the United States"
Pursuant to its mandate under the CWA, the Corps has
promulgated regulations which define the term "waters of the
United States" 48 by dividing the "waters" into three categories.
The first category is the Corps' traditional area of navigable and
interstate waters. 49 The second category is wetlands adjacent to
tor cited the following in support of the proposition that the Corps' jurisdiction
is not limited to traditional navigable waters:
United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 183-85 (4th Cir. 1985) (the court
cited legislative history indicating . . .broad congressional intent for
the jurisdictional term "navigable waters" as support for its conclusion
that the "reach of the Clean Water Act extends beyond discharges into
waters actually supporting navigation"); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799,
802-04 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It is generally agreed that congress [sic], by
adopting this definition [of navigable waters], intended to assert federal
jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible
under the Constitution ...."); United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536,
538 (11th Cir. 1983) ("It is generally agreed that Congress intended
Iwaters of the United States' [jurisdiction under the CWA] to reach the
full extent permissible under the Constitution."); United States v. Byrd,
609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he legislative history ... es-
tablished that Congress wanted to give the term 'navigable waters' the
'broadest possible Constitutional interpretation.' "); Leslie Salt Co. v.
Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 754-56 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1978) ("This Court has
indicated that the term 'navigable waters' within the meaning of the
FWPCA is to be given the broadest possible constitutional interpreta-
tion under the Commerce Clause."); Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d
1198, 1200 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[T]hat the Congress intended to ex-
tend the Act's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit is clear."), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co.,
504 F.2d 1317, 1320-29 (6th Cir. 1974) ("We have indulged this much
quotation from the statutory language in order to make the point that
Congress' clear intention [was to assert broad jurisdiction"].); see also
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 914-16 (5th Cir.
1983) (citing legislative history supporting its conclusion that a broad
interpretation of jurisdiction under the CWA was a reasonable reading
of the Act)).
Id.
48. Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328 (1990). The
Corps states the purpose of the regulation section is to define "the term 'waters
of the United States' as it applies to the jurisdictional limits of the authority of
the Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act." Id. § 328.1.
49. Id. § 328.3. The Section includes the following definitions:
(a) The term "waters of the United States" means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
Id. § 328.3(a)(l)&(2).
The definition in section 328.3(a)(1) is similar to the Corps' general defini-
tion of navigable waters found in section 329.4. For a discussion of the Corps'
traditional meaning of this term, see supra note 37-43. "Waters" also include all
tributaries. Id. § 328.3(a)(5).
10
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waters. 50 A third category is all "other waters" which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce. 5' These "other waters" include
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams, and other structures that hold
water.5
2
E. Classification of "Waters" Based on Their Hydrological
Connection with Other Waters
For purposes of defining its jurisdiction, the Corps has cate-
gorized "waters of the United States" based on the Corps' tradi-
tional "navigable" definition, the interstate location of the waters,
and the physical structure of the water body.53
For purposes of this Note, cases challenging the Corps' inter-
pretation of "waters," and thus the Corps' jurisdiction over the
"water," can also be classified by two distinct physical characteris-
tics of the water itself: those cases where "waters" are hydrologi-
cally connected to other waters, and those where "waters" are
non-hydrologically connected.M
50. Id. § 328.3(a)(7). "The term 'wetlands' means those areas that are in-
undated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a preva-
lence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Id.
§ 328.3(b). Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar ar-
eas. Id.
Adjacent wetlands are those waters bordering, contiguous or neighboring
but otherwise separated from other "waters of the United States" by natural or
man-made barriers. Id. § 328.3(c).
51. Id. § 328.3(a)(3). The Corps lists examples of waters which by their
use, degradation or destruction could affect interstate or foreign commerce as
including waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in inter-
state or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by indus-
tries in interstate commerce;
Id.
For the complete list of examples of waters, see infra note 159.
52. Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)
(1990). All othe- waters include "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including in-
termittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds .... Id.
53. For a discussion of the Corps' categorization of "waters of the United
States," see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of cases challenging Corps jurisdiction over each cate-
gory of "water," see infra notes 55-112 and accompanying text. For the defini-
tion of "hydrologically connected," see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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1. Challenges to Corps Jurisdiction over Waters Hydrologically
Connected with Other Waters
Challenges to Corps jurisdiction over hydrologically con-
nected waters not falling squarely into Corps regulatory descrip-
tions have failed because the intent of Congress is clear: water
pollution that moves in hydrologic cycles must be controlled at
the source. 55
a. Wetlands
Wetlands may not be directly hydrologically connected to
other bodies of water, and are, therefore, harder to define, 56 but
their very nature and ecological function supports the contention
that wetland pollution or destruction affects adjacent waters and
thus merits protection. 57 Because Congress has expressed special
55. For a discussion of cases challenging Corps jurisdiction over hydrologi-
cally connected waters, see infra notes 56-92 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of congressional intent on this subject, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
56. One commentator surveyed the changing definitions of wetlands and
stated: "like the land and waters it defines, the Corps' definition of the term
'wetlands' has not been immutable. The definitions which have been used by
the Corps in its various past regulations have differed significantly .... "
Schlauch & Strickland, Changing Land to Water- The Alchemy of the Federal Wetlands
Regulatory Scheme, 27A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 635, 715 (1981).
For the latest Corps regulations defining wetlands, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text. Compare the current definition with an earlier regulation
defining wetlands as follows: an area "inundated or saturated by water at a fre-
quency and duration sufficient to support aquatic vegetation. This inundation or
saturation may be caused by either surface water, ground water, or a combina-
tion of both." 42 Fed. Reg. 37,112, 37,128 (1977).
Another commentator takes a more cynical view of the Corps' evolving
regulations:
Building dams had gone out of style, the Corps needed a new bailiwick
and environmental activism was it. Consequently, the Corps, which
had designated wetlands on the basis of the land's functions, changed
the formula to include such factors as plant types and chemical proper-
ties and moisture of the soil.
N.Y. Times, April 3, 1991, § A, at 21, col 1.
57. The court in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539
(E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988),
summed up the importance of wetlands in relation to its surrounding ecology:
[W]etlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are the Nation's most biologi-
cally active areas. They represent a principal source of food supply.
They are the spawning grounds for much of the fish and shellfish which
populate the oceans, and they are passages for numerous upland game
fish. They also provide nesting areas for a myriad of species of birds
and wildlife. The unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter
which needs to be corrected and which implementation of section 404
has attempted to achieve.
Id. at 1543-44 (quoting 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4326, 4336).
The importance of wetlands to adjacent waters is made clear simply by the
12
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol2/iss2/7
LESLIE SALT Co. V. UNITED STATES
interest in the fate of wetlands, 58 the Corps has been given broad
authority to determine what is a wetland. 59 Courts have generally
given deference to the Corps' wetlands definitions. 60
The Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes,61 evaluated the scope of Corps jurisdiction under both the
CWA and the Corps' corresponding regulations. 62 In 1976, Riv-
erside began construction of a housing development on marshy,
lake shore lands.63 The Corps asserted jurisdiction over the
property as an adjacent wetland. 64 The Sixth Circuit denied the
Corps jurisdiction.65 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"the language, policies, and history of the Clean Water Act com-
regulations that define Corps jurisdiction over wetlands to be limited to wet-
lands adjacent to waters of the United States. Definition of Waters of the United
States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (1990). The Corps has stressed the importance
of wetlands in cases where wetlands jurisdiction has been adjudicated. See Track
12 Inc. v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 618 F. Supp. 448,
450 (D. Minn. 1985) (Corps stressed importance of tract as wildlife habitat,
floodwater storage area and source of water quality benefits).
58. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 915 (5th Cir.
1983) ("[in fact, Congress repeatedly recognized the importance of protecting
wetlands if the nation was to realize the statutory goal of restoring the chemical
and biological integrity of the nation's waters."). For a further statement of con-
gressional concern for the fate of. wetlands, see supra note 57.
59. The Corps has the primary responsibility for determining whether par-
ticular tracts are wetlands. CWA §§ 404(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(c). The
Corps may enlist the aid of the EPA in "special cases." Jurisdiction of Dredge
and Fill Program; Memorandum of Understanding, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,018 (1980).
See also Hanson, 623 F. Supp. at 1545 (in wetlands determination, Corps must
evaluate vegetation, hydrology, and soils).
60. See Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 906 ("[t]he determination [of wetland condi-
tion] . . . which requires an analysis of the types of vegetation, soil and water
conditions . . . is the kind of scientific decision normally accorded significant
deference by the courts").
61. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). Interestingly, Justice White, who delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court in Riverside, was the only Justice willing to grant
the petition of Leslie Salt Co. for writ of certiorari to review the decision in Leslie
H. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, - U.S. -. , 111 S.Ct. 1089, 1090 (1991).
62. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 123. The Riverside court stated the issue as follows:
This case presents the question whether the Clean Water Act (CWA),
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., together with certain regulations promulgated
under its authority by the Army Corps of Engineers, authorizes the
Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before
discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of
water and their tributaries.
Id.
63. Id. at 124.
64. Id. at 124-25. When Riverside persisted in discharging fill materials
without a permit, the Corps sued to enjoin Riverside from filling the property
without Corps' permission with the district court holding the wetlands subject to
Corps jurisdiction. Id.
65. Id. at 125. The Sixth Circuit held that Corps regulations excluded from
the category of adjacent wetlands, and hence from "waters of the United
1991] 475
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pel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting
the Act to require permits for the discharge of fill material into
wetlands adjacent to the 'waters of the United States.' "66
The Supreme Court in Riverside found that the issue of the
Corps' asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically called
to Congress' attention during a 1977 debate over proposed
changes to the CWA. 67 Congress had rejected measures designed
to limit Corps jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court found this to
be evidence of the reasonableness of the Corps' interpretation of
the CWA.
6 8
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court considered
important the hydrological connection between the wetlands and
adjacent water.69 The Supreme Court deemed the Corps' regula-
tions reasonable even though the wetlands were not directly hy-
drologically linked because the wetlands affect the water quality
of adjacent waters in other hydrologically beneficial ways. 70 It is
important to note that the Court did not specifically address the
issue of Corps jurisdiction over non-adjacent waters and thus did
not decide Corps jurisdiction over waters with no hydrological
connection with other waters. 71
States," those wetlands "that were not subject to flooding by adjacent navigable
waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation." Id.
66. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139. The Supreme Court reviewed and approved
the reasonableness of the Corps' interpretation of "waters of the United States"
as used in the CWA. Id. Citing legislative history, the Supreme Court inferred
that Congress intended to exercise broad jurisdiction in its attempt "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the nation's wa-
ters. Id. at 132-33. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress meant to exer-
cise its commerce power to regulate some waters not traditionally considered
navigable. Id. at 133.
67. Id. at 135-37.
68. Id. The Supreme Court held that "a refusal by Congress to overrule an
agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonable-
ness of that construction, particularly where the administrative construction has
been brought to Congress's attention through legislation specifically designed
to supplant it." Id. at 137.
69. Id. at 132-35. The Supreme Court noted that a congressional report
discussed water moving in hydrological cycles as an essential reason for control-
ling water pollution at its source. Id. at 132-33. The Court also noted Corps
regulations explaining the need for expanded jurisdiction based on waters
within the aquatic system which move in hydrological cycles. Id. at 134.
70. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134-35. The Supreme Court noted that wetlands,
even though not flooded by adjacent waters, still may tend to drain into those
waters. Id. The wetlands may (1) filter and purify the water as it drains, (2) slow
the flow of runoff into lakes, rivers, and streams and prevent flooding and ero-
sion, and (3) serve significant natural biological functions including providing
habitat for aquatic species. Id.
71. Id. at 131 n.8. The Supreme Court stated "[w]e are not called upon to
address the question of the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill
14
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b. Artificially Created Waters
Corps jurisdiction is not barred because a hydrologically con-
nected water was artificially created. In Holland, the court held
that Congress intended the Corps to have broad jurisdiction
under the CWA.72 The court stated that jurisdiction should ex-
tend to waters conveying pollutants into other bodies of water,
such as canals, whether they were man-made or not.73 In United
States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. ,74 the court held that water in a city
sewer system, into which pollutants were being discharged, was a
"water of the United States" under the CWA because the sewer
emptied into the Mississippi River. 75
Similarly, the fact that wetlands were artificially created is not
a bar to Corps jurisdiction. 76 In Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke,77 the
Ninth Circuit held that waters which were formerly subjected to
tidal inundation from other waters were still under Corps CWA
jurisdiction even when currently separated from those waters by
material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water ... and we
do not express any opinion on that question." Id. For a reaction to Riverside by
developers, see supra note 14.
72. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668-76 (M.D. Fla. 1974). For
a further discussion of the Holland court's broad interpretation of the Corps'
jurisdiction, see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 673-74. The Holland court held that man-made, non-navigable
mosquito canals which empty into a bayou arm of the Tampa Bay in Florida are
"waters of the United States." Id. See also United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d
1169, 1172-75 (5th Cir. 1981) (illegal and unauthorized acts of third parties can
create Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction when artificially created canal became
connected to tidal waterway), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940 (1981).
74. 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
75. Id. at 946-47. The suit was filed by the United States against an alleged
discharger of pollutants into the Mississippi River via the City of Memphis Was-
tewater Collection System. The Velsicol court found the sewer to be a "water of
the United States" as defined in CWA section 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(1987). For the text of section 502(7), see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320, 323 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (prior
Supreme Court observation that congressional concern with "entire hydrologic
cycle" leads to broad definition of wetlands supporting Corps claim ofjurisdic-
tion over man-made wetlands); Track 12 Inc. v. District Engineer, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 618 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Minn. 1985) (argument that
Corps lacks jurisdiction because tract is not natural wetland is contrary to legis-
lative and judicial authority); United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 494
(D.N.J. 1984) (fact that part of area may have become wetlands because of man-
made connection between site and tidal waterways not dispositive because
Corps jurisdiction determined by whether site is presently wetland, not how it
became wetland), aff'd, 772 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014
(1986); United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 883 (D. Md. 1981) (histori-
cal condition of land irrelevant where area was wetland at time Corps asserted
jurisdiction).
77. 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978).
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man-made dikes. 78
c. Government Created Waters
The fact that the government itself has helped create the
body of water does not bar Corps jurisdiction. A narrow excep-
tion to this general rule 79 was established, however, in United
States v. City of Fort Pierre.80 In Fort Pierre, the Corps asserted juris-
diction over a dry slough that had begun to exhibit wetland char-
acteristics as a direct result of the Corps' ordinary river
maintenance (dredging activities) on a nearby river. 8' The Fort
Pierre court held that the Corps could not claim jurisdiction in this
narrow instance because of the "peculiar facts and unique circum-
stances" of the Corps activity.8 2
In United States v. Southern Inv. Co. ,83 the Corps had built a
dam which may have caused a portion of defendant's land to ac-
quire wetland characteristics.84 In contrast to Fort Pierre, the
Southern Inv. court held that even if the Corps indisputably caused
the wetland conditions, the Corps maintained jurisdiction be-
cause building a dam is not ordinary river maintenance. There-
fore, the narrow Fort Pierre exception did not apply. 85
d. Temporary or Seasonal Waters
Just as the artificial nature or construction of a water body is
irrelevant to Corps jurisdiction, the same is true for temporary or
78. Id. at 756. The property in question was not the subject of Leslie's cur-
rent suit.
79. For a discussion of the general rule that government created waters are
still be subject to Corps jurisdiction, see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
80. 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 467. The Fort Pierre court found the water in the area to be pol-
luted, stagnant, devoid of wildlife, and not conducive to significant use by the
public. Id.
82. Id. at 466-67. The Fort Pierre court denied Corps jurisdiction when "the
Corps, as an unintended by-product of ordinary river maintenance, inadver-
tently creates a wetland-type ecological system on private property where no
such system previously existed." Id. at 476. The Court neither decided whether
Congress could not assert jurisdiction over the slough if it chose to, nor did it
challenge Corps jurisdiction over any other artificially created wetlands. Id.
83. 876 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 609.
85. Id. at 612. See also Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.
1986) (Corps construction of dam which raised water level to cover private land
created waters under Corps jurisdiction); United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182,
184 (4th Cir. 1985) (federal construction of mosquito-control drainage ditch
created waters under Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds,
481 U.S. 412, 414 n. 1 (1987).
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seasonal water body formations. The court in United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp.86 reviewed the legislative history of the CWA
and concluded that "waters of the United States" include nor-
mally dry arroyos8 7 which have a hydrological connection with
other waters. 88
Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA 89 decided the question of jurisdic-
tion over a normally dry arroyo and creek being used for waste
discharge. 90 The Quivira court concluded that, under the CWA,
Congress intended to regulate discharges into all bodies of water
effecting interstate commerce. 9 1 The court emphasized in two
separate portions of its opinion the fact that, although surface
flow occurred only occasionally, there were other hydrological
connections between the arroyo, creek and other bodies of
water.92
2. Challenges to Corps Jurisdiction over Waters not Hydrologically
Connected with Other Waters
a. Recreation and Industry as the Basis for a Water's
Interstate Commerce Connection
Waters that are not hydrologically connected with other "wa-
ters of the United States" must have an independent connection
.86. 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975).
87. An arroyo is a "deep gully cut by an intermittent stream; dry gulch."
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 129 (2d College ed. 1982).
88. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp. at 1184-87. The court held the following:
[T]he legal definition of... "waters of the United States" within the
scope of the [CWA] includes any waterway within the United States also
including normally dry arroyos through which water may flow, where
such water will ultimately end up in public waters such as a river or
stream, tributary to a river or stream, lake, reservoir, bay, gulf, sea or
ocean either within or adjacent to the United States.
Id. at 1187.
89. 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
90. Id. at 127, 129. The plaintiff discharged waste into the waters from its
uranium mining mills. Id. at 127.
91. Id. at 129-30.
92. Id. at 130. The Quivira court noted that although the arroyo and creek
were not navigable, during heavy rainfall a surface connection was established
with other navigable waters. The court emphasized that the waters of the arroyo
and creek soak into the earth and become part of underground aquifers, and this
underground water eventually discharges in another spring or creek. Id. at 129.
The Quivira court further stated that its findings were compelled by the evi-
dence that during heavy rainfall there was a surface connection between the ar-
royo and creek and other navigable-in-fact streams. Id. at 130. The court
further added that the water flow continued regularly though underground aqui-
fers fed by the surface flow in the arroyo and creek, and this flow eventually
made its way into navigable-in-fact streams. Id.
1991] 479
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to interstate commerce for Corps jurisdiction to be upheld.93
United States v. Byrd 94 decided the issue of Corps jurisdiction over
an inland intrastate lake and its adjacent wetland. The Byrd court
concluded that Congress could extend Corps jurisdiction under
the CWA, based on commerce clause power, where the interstate
commerce connection is based on recreational use of the lake by
out-of-state visitors.95
The Tenth Circuit in Utah v. Marsh96 decided the issue of
Corps jurisdiction over a lake with no navigable tributary or out-
let outside the state of Utah.97 The court upheld Corps jurisdic-
tion based on the lake's interstate commerce connection because
the lake was used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce,
supported a fishery whose products were sold out-of-state, and
provided interstate travelers with recreational opportunities.98
The court in Fort Pierre, denied Corps jurisdiction over a
slough exhibiting some wetland characteristics but otherwise hav-
ing no hydrological connection to any other bodies of water.99
The court based its decision in part on the fact that the slough
was "devoid of wildlife, supports no fish or fowl, and is not con-
ducive to recreation or other significant use by the public."' 0 0
93. This is in contrast to waters with hydrological connections; congres-
sional intent in the CWA to protect from pollution all traditional waters of the
United States that are joined in the hydrological cycle by other waters clearly
establishes an interstate commerce connection. See supra notes 56-92 and
accompanying text.
The question of the extent of the hydrological connection was found to be
determinative in Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D Mich. 1985).
In Kelley, the court held that Congress did not intend CWAjurisdiction to apply
over groundwater contamination. Id. at 1107. The Kelley decision was handed
down prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Riverside, which reversed a CWA
jurisdictional scope question in the Kelley circuit. As such, Kelley may not be
good law today.
94. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
95. Id. at 1210. The recreational use must be for water related recreational
purposes such as fishing or swimming. Id.
96. 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 800. The court found that half the water in the lake was lost
though evaporation, and the rest was delivered via a river and irrigation canal to
industry. Id. at 800-01. The effect pollution had on the river or canal was not
considered and was not the basis of the court's opinion.
98. Id. at 803. The recreational opportunities included fishing, hunting,
boating, water skiing, picnicking, camping, observation, photography, and ap-
preciation of bird and animal life. Id.
99. Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464. For a discussion of other aspects of the Fort
Pierre case, see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 467.
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b. A Water's Interstate Commerce Connection Based
Solely on the Presence of Migratory Birds
The question of the Corps' CWA jurisdiction over non-hy-
drologically connected waters, where the jurisdiction is based
solely on the presence of migratory birds, has not been specifi-
cally answered by the courts. In National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Laubscher,1 1 the court identified the issue as whether the Corps
had jurisdiction, under the CWA, over an intrastate pond visited
by migratory birds.1 02 However, the court then described the
pond as a wetland 03 and concluded that it was within the jurisdic-
tion of the Corps because "a wetland visited by migratory birds is
a wetland within the jurisdiction of [the Corps]."' 10 4
The court in Tabb Lakes Ltd v. United States 105 also avoided
deciding the question of Corps jurisdiction over bodies of water
when jurisdiction is based solely on the presence of migratory
birds. 10 6 In Tabb, the Corps claimed jurisdiction based on the
presence of migratory birds and supported its authority with a
memorandum from a deputy director of the Corps. 10 7 The mem-
orandum stated that "[w]aters which are used or could be used as
habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines" is a basis
for Corps jurisdiction under the CWA.' 0 8 The Tabb court deter-
mined the Corps did not have jurisdiction on the narrow grounds
that the memorandum did not meet federal administrative agency
notice and comment requirements. 0 9 The court, however, did
express its opinion on the subject stating that it had "grave
doubts that a property now so used, or seen as an expectant
101. 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
102. Id. at 549. The EPA was also a federal defendant in the case with simi-
lar jurisdictional rights as the Corps under the CWA. Id.
103. Id. at n.1. "[The pond] is a thirty acre wetland located in Willacy
County, Texas." Id.
104. Id. at 549. It is not certain whether the visits of migratory birds was the
sole reason for jurisdiction because wetlands have other characteristics that sup-
port its designation as a "water of the United States." For a discussion of Corps
wetland jurisdiction, see supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
105. 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
106. Id. at 729.
107. Id. at 728.
108. Id.
109. Tabb, 715 F. Supp. at 729. The APA's [Administrative and Procedures
Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988)] "notice and comment provisions seek to insure
[sic] public participation and fairness to affected parties where agencies hold
governmental authority." Id. at 728. The Tabb court stated that it must set aside
the Corps' actions because the Corps' memorandum was not exempted from the
APA's notice and comment requirements. Id. at 729.
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habitat for some migratory birds, can be declared to be such a
nexus to interstate commerce as to warrant Army Corps of Engi-
neers jurisdiction." " 10
After Tabb the Corps formally published a clarification of
"waters of the United States" to include waters used by migratory
birds."I ' The Corps also broadly defined its jurisdiction to in-
clude, on a case-by-case basis, many artificially created bodies of
water that have no hydrological connection to other bodies of
water. "12
110. Id.
111. The issue in Tabb, compliance with the APA's notice and comment
requirements, was resolved when the Corps published the following clarification
of its definition of "waters of the United States":
[W]aters of the United States ... also include the following waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species.
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (1986). The regulations also included waters used to irrigate
crops sold in interstate commerce. Id.
112. Id. The Corps stated its authority as follows:
For clarification it should be noted that we generally do not consider
the following waters to be "Waters of the United States." However, the
Corps reserves the right on a case-by-case basis to determine that a
particular waterbody within these categories of waters is a water of the
United States. EPA also has the right to determine on a case-by-case
basis if any of these waters are "waters of the United States."
(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry
land.
(b) Artificially irrigated areas which would revert to upland if the
irrigation ceased.
(c) Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating and/or diking
dry land to collect and retain water and which are used exclusively
for such purposes as stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, or
rice growing.
(d) Artificial reflecting or swimming pools or other small orna-
mental bodies of water created by excavating and/or diking dry
land to retain water for primarily aesthetic reasons.
(e) Waterfilled depressions created in dry land incidental to con-
struction activity and pits excavated in dry land for the purpose of
obtaining fill, sand, or gravel unless and until the construction or
excavation operation is abandoned and the resulting body of water
meets the definition of waters of the United States (see 33 C.F.R.
328.3(a)).
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III. THE LESLIE SALT CO. V UNITED STATES CASE
A. The Factual Background and Procedural History
Leslie I "13 involved Corps' claims of jurisdiction over two
distinct portions of land based on two different legal theories. 1
4
The first parcel of land was claimed as an adjacent wetland even
though government actions helped make it aquatic. 1 5 The other
parcel of land was claimed as an "other water" defined in the
Corps' regulations. 1 6
The dispute revolved around a 153 acre tract of undeveloped
land owned by the Leslie Salt Co. and located south of San Fran-
cisco in the city of Newark, Alameda County, California."i 7 The
property lies east of the San Francisco National Wildlife Refuge
and is approximately one quarter mile from the Newark Slough, a
tidal water of the San Francisco Bay." 18 There are neither tribu-
tary streams or rivers on, or adjacent to, the property, nor has the
property ever been inundated by tides."t 9 A road divides the
property into two parcels: one of 143 acres (parcel 143) and one
of 10 acres (parcel 10).120
113. 896 F.2d 354 (1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1089 (1991).
114. Id. at 356-57. For purposes of describing the characteristics of the
land in controversy, both the appellate court and district court descriptions are
cited. The descriptions of the land complement each other. The appellate court
did not find the district court's finding of fact pertaining to the land to be in
error. For a discussion of the description of the land and procedural history of
the case in controversy, see notes 113-39 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 356.
116. Id. at 357.
117. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 355. The land is also referred to as the Newark
Coyote Property. Id.
118. Id.
119. Leslie I, 700 F. Supp. at 479.
120. Id. The district court refers to the parcels of land by the terms "parcel
143" and "parcel 10." Id. Because the issues in the case are very sensitive to the
exact nature and location of the land, and because the features and boundaries
have changed over the years, the district court provided the following detailed
description:
[The property] is surrounded on all sides by roads and highways. The
one hundred forty-three acre parcel ("parcel 143") is bounded on the
north by State Highway 84, on the west by Thornton Avenue, on the
south by relocated Jarvis Avenue, and on the east by Jarvis Avenue,
with residential subdivisions of the City of Newark lying east across
Jarvis Avenue. The ten acre parcel ("parcel 10") is located across relo-
cated Jarvis Avenue to the south of parcel 143 and is bounded by.
Thornton and Jarvis Avenues.
Across Thornton Avenue to the west of the property is the San
Francisco National Wildlife Refuge, situated on land which was previ-
ously taken from Leslie by condemnation action of United States. The
nearest navigable water is Newark Slough, which is approximately one
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The property, originally pastureland, was acquired by Les-
lie's predecessors in interest in the late 1800's and used for the
production of salt.' 2 1 As part of the production process, they ex-
cavated pits (pits) on the eastern one-third of parcel 143 for de-
positing calcium chloride, and created crystallizer ponds
(crystallizers) on the western two-thirds. 22 Salt production on
the property stopped, for the most part, in 1959.123
Although salt production had ceased, the pits and crystalliz-
ers remained and each year they temporarily filled with water.' 24
The Leslie II court found that although the "ponding" was limited,
"standing water did form on the property and remain long
enough for fish and plant life to live in the ponds."' 125 More im-
portantly for the Corps' claim, the Leslie II court found that when
the crystallizers and pits were flooded during the winter and
quarter mile from the southernmost tip of the property, and that point
is approximately two miles from San Francisco Bay.
Id.
121. Leslie I, 700 F. Supp. at 479-80. To further the manufacture of salt,
Leslie's predecessor constructed a railroad spur, a salt refining plant, and re-
lated buildings. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 355.
122. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 355. The court describes the crystallizers as
"large, shallow, water-tight basins." Id. The salt crystallizers "held salt brine
during the final stage of the solar salt production process." Leslie I, 700 F. Supp.
at 480. The district court further expounded on how the crystallizers were con-
structed and how they were used as follows:
The crystallizers were constructed on dry land, by excavating large
shallow basins, and leveling and compacting the soil on the bottom to
create a level and watertight surface. The excavated soil was used to
build earthen levees around the crystallizers to form watertight earthen
containers. During the years of their use by Leslie, saturated salt brine
(which had been produced by Leslie's evaporation ponds located closer
to San Francisco Bay) was pumped through the Coyote Hills and into
the crystallizers. The salt then precipitated and settled onto the bottom
of the crystallizers. The remaining liquid was drawn off, and the salt
was harvested by large mechanical harvesters that ran across the floor
of the crystallizers. The salt was then moved by railcars to a refining
plant located on the property. After each harvest of the salt, the crys-
tallizers were drained, releveled, and recompacted.
Id.
123. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 355. The district court noted that the production
of salt had become uneconomical, although there was some limited production
in 1962 and 1968. Leslie 1, 700 F. Supp. at 480.
124. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 355. The appellate court explained that the San
Francisco Bay Area has a Mediterranean climate where rain is not consistent
throughout the year but occurs primarily in the winter and spring months. Id. at
355 n. 1.
125. Id. at 355-56. The formation of plant life in the crystallizers was
helped by Leslie plowing the property in 1983 to combat a dust problem. Previ-
ously, plant life had been nonexistent due to the high salinity and compaction of
the soil. Id.
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spring, migratory birds used them as a habitat. 126
The Leslie II court found the property was "substantially af-
fected by construction of a sewer line and public roads on and
around the property."' 127 This construction created, besides
ditches and road beds, "culverts which hydrologically connected
the property to the Newark Slough."1 28 The Leslie II court noted
that Caltrans, the state highway authority, had in part caused the
tidal backflow to reach the property by building the culverts,
breaching a levy on the wildlife refuge adjacent to the property
and by destroying a tidegate which had previously prevented the
tidal backflow from reaching Leslie's property. 129 The Leslie II
court maintained that the effect of this human activity was "to fos-
ter natural, ecological developments" which included the creation
of some wetland features on the southern fringes of the property
and use of the property by an endangered species. 130
In late 1985, Leslie started to dig a feeder ditch and siltation
pond on parcel 143 in order to drain the land.' 3 1 The Corps is-
sued a cease and desist order pursuant to its authority under sec-
tion 404 of the CWA, 132 "claiming that Leslie was discharging a
pollutant, [fill], into waters of the United States in violation of
section 301 of the CWA." 5 3s The Corps issued a second cease
and desist order in early 1987 to stop Leslie from blocking a cul-
126. Id. at 356.
127. Id.
128. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 356. The district court found that the culverts
drained the property of water and subjected it to some backflow. Leslie 1, 700
F. Supp. at 479. The district court then described the location of the culverts in
relation to the property:
One is located at the southernmost tip of parcel 10, and runs under
Thornton Avenue to Newark Slough. The second is located near the
intersection of Jarvis and Thornton, and runs under Thornton Avenue
onto the wildlife refuge. The third is located approximately halfway up
Thornton Avenue, and also runs under Thornton Avenue and onto the
wildlife refuge.
Id.
129. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 356, 358.
130. Id. at 356. The appellate court found that tidewater on the edges of
Leslie's property caused the wetland features. Id. The endangered species was
the salt marsh harvest mouse. Id.
131. Id.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. For a discussion of section 404 of the CWA, see
supra note 33-34 and accompanying text.
133. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 356. "The Corps also claimed that Leslie's activi-
ties were obstructing the navigable waters of the United States in violation of
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act." Id. For a discussion
of the Rivers and Harbors Act, see supra note 40 and accompanying text. For the
definition of "fill," see supra note 33.
1991] 485
23
Lessner: Leslie Salt Co. v. United States: Keep the Birds out of Your Bird
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
486 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II: p. 463
vert which connects the property to the Newark Slough. 34
In issuing the cease and desist order, the Corps claimed juris-
diction over the majority of the Leslie Salt property.' 35 Leslie
challenged the Corps' claim of jurisdiction and filed suit. The
Corps countersued to establish its jurisdiction over the property
and claimed that Leslie had violated the CWA and the Rivers and
Harbors Act' 36 "in connection with its activities on or connected
with the property."' 137 The district court found in favor of Leslie,
holding that the property was not subject to the Corps' jurisdic-
tion.' 38 The Corps then appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit.' 39
The Leslie II court began its analysis by framing the issue as
one of jurisdiction over the two parcels of land: (1) whether most
of parcel 10 and the southern tip of parcel 143 are adjacent wet-
lands and part of the Corps' CWA jurisdiction, in spite of the fact
that government actions made them aquatic; and (2) whether the
former crystallizers and calcium chloride pits are "other waters,"
as defined by the Corps' regulations, and subject to its jurisdic-
tion under the CWA? 140
The Leslie II court considered separately the standard of re-
view for the district court's findings and the Corps' regulations.' 4 '
It declared that the district court's findings of fact were subject to
the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.' 42 The court was
similarly deferential when considering the Corps' interpretation
of the CWA, deferring to the agency's analysis if it was "reason-
able and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." 43
But the appellate court regarded issues of law, involving consid-
eration of legal concepts rather than essentially factual inquiries,
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Leslie I, 700 F. Supp. at 477. For a discussion of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 490.
139. Leslie II, 896 F.2d 354. Save San Francisco Bay Association and the
National Audubon Society also joined the appeal, intervening on behalf of the
Corps. Id. at 356.
140. Id. at 356-57.
141. Id. at 357.
142. Id.
143. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 357 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837, 844-45 (1984)). "The agency's interpretation of its own regulations is enti-
tled to greater deference, amounting to a plain error standard." Id.
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to be reviewable de novo. 14 4
B. Corps Jurisdiction over the Southern Portions of Leslie's
Property as "Wetlands"
The Court of Appeals first considered the issue of the Corps'
jurisdictional claim over the southern portions of property as
"wetlands."' 45 The appellate court examined the three reasons
provided by the district court for denying the Corps' jurisdiction
and found them each to be erroneous. 146
1. Wetlands Created by the Government Theory
The appellate court first examined the district court's denial
of jurisdiction based on the fact that the wetland conditions were
caused by the government. The appellate court noted that "Con-
gress intended to create a very broad grant of jurisdiction in the
Clean Water Act, extending to any aquatic features within the
reach of the commerce clause power." 147
The district court in Leslie I had found an exception to this
congressional mandate when the changes to the property were
caused by the government, reasoning that the Corps should not
be allowed "to expand its own jurisdiction by creating some wet-
land conditions where none existed before."' 4 8 The district court
had relied on Fort Pierre; however, the appellate court distin-
guished Leslie Salt I & H from Fort Pierre on the facts. 149 The ap-
pellate court found, unlike Fort Pierre, that "the Corps was not
directly and solely responsible for flooding Leslie's land;"' 150 the
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 357-59. The district court had denied the Corps jurisdiction
over the parcel because: "(1) the wetland conditions were caused by the govern-
ment; (2) the conditions were not normal, as required by 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)
and; (3) the property was not adjacent to waters of the United States, as required
by 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)." Id. at 357.
147. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 357 (citing Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F:2d
742, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing California v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 964 n. 1 (9th
Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 426 U.S. 200, (1976))). For a discussion of con-
gressional intent in enacting the CWA, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of congressional power under the commerce clause, see supra
notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 358. For a discussion of Fort Pierre, see supra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text.
150. Id. at 358. The appellate court noted that other parties were responsi-
ble for allowing water to flow onto Leslie's property: "[1] Caltrans constructed
the culverts which allowed water to flow onto Leslie's property; [2] Caltrans and
the Fish and Wildlife Service breached the levee on the wildlife refuge adjacent
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Corps, therefore, was not attempting to expand its own
jurisdiction. 151
The appellate court added that even if third parties, includ-
ing the government, were responsible for flooding Leslie's land,
the Corps' jurisdiction did not depend on how the property be-
came a water of the United States because "Congress intended to
regulate local aquatic ecosystems regardless of their origin."' 152
2. Man-Made Wetlands Theory
The district court also reasoned that because the wetlands
were man-made, they were 'not "normal" as required by the
Corps' regulations. 153 The Court of Appeals, in rejecting this
to Leslie's property which allowed water to flow up the culverts; [3] Caltrans and
the Fish and Wildlife Service failed to place effective floodgates on the culverts;
and [4] Leslie itself maintained floodgates which unknown third parties propped
open." Id.
151. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 358. The appellate court also stated that the find-
ing by the district court that "the Corps flooded the wildlife refuge and thereby
brought tidewater further inland" directly contradicted the record. Id. at 358
n.7.
152. Id. at 358. The appellate court deemed that how the land became a
"water of the United States" was "irrelevant." Id. The court cited the following
cases as authority for this proposition:
Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1986) (Corps con-
struction of a dam creates waters under Corps jurisdiction); United
States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1985) (federal construction
of mosquito- control ditch creates waters under Rivers and Harbors Act
jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412, 414 n. 1, 107 S.Ct.
1831, 1834 n. 1, 95 L.Ed.2d 365, 371 (1987); United States v. DeFelice,
641 F.2d at 1175 (illegal and unauthorized acts of third parties can cre-
ate Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940, 102
S.Ct. 474, 70 L.Ed.2d 247 (1981); Track 12 Inc. v. District Engineer,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 618 F. Supp. 448, 449 (D. Minn. 1985)
(state and locality construction of highway and sewage system creates
Corps jurisdiction).
Id.
The appellate court further stated that a landowner 's remedy for harm
caused by the Corps' claim of jurisdiction under the CWA is to seek damages
through inverse condemnation proceedings. Id. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. at 128; see generally First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
For a discussion of cases on the issue of Corps jurisdiction irrespective of
how the property became a "water of the United States," see supra notes 72-85
and accompanying text.
153. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 358. The appellate court was referring to regula-
tions under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b). For the text of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1987),
see supra note 50. The appellate court noted that the district court had "found
the requisite wetland conditions." Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 358. The district court
held, however, that "circumstances in those areas are not 'normal,' because the
ability to support [wetland] vegetation was caused primarily by the government's
flooding of the wildlife refuge across [the road]." Id.
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reasoning, stated that "normal" excluded only those areas which
are not aquatic but still experience an "abnormal presence of
aquatic vegetation."' 54 Because the district court found the
southern portions were in fact aquatic areas, the issue of whether
the wetlands were artificially or naturally created was
irrelevant. 5 5
3. Wetlands not Adjacent to Waters Theory
Finally, the appellate court rejected the district court's hold-
ing that the wetland portion of the property was not adjacent to
waters of the United States, as required by the Corps' regula-
tions. 156 The appellate court found that the culverts on the prop-
erty, by which water flowed directly to the Newark. Slough and
then on to the San Francisco Bay, were waters of the United
States, and therefore, the property was adjacent to those
waters.'
57
C. Corps Jurisdiction over the Crystallizers and Pits
as "Other Waters"
After deciding in favor of the Corps on the wetland issue,
which concerned the southern portion of Leslie's property, the
appellate court considered the Corps' claim of jurisdiction over
the property containing the crystallizers and pits.' 5 8 The Corps
based its jurisdictional claim on its definition of the crystallizers
and pits as "other waters," as defined in the Corps' regula-
tions.' 5 9 The district court held that the crystallizers and pits
154. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 358 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 358-59. For a discussion of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) and the defi-
nition of "adjacent wetlands," see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
157. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 358-59. The district court disregarded the cul-
verts because they were artificially created by Caltrans and the Fish and Wildlife
Service. Id. For a description of the culverts in relation to Leslie's property, see
supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 359-60.
159. Id. at 359. Corps regulations define "waters of the United States" to
include the following:
All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including inter-
mittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degrada-
tion or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers
for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
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were not described by the Corps' regulations and based its hold-
ing on two separate grounds: (1) the crystallizers and pits are arti-
ficial structures, and the regulations list only natural formations
("artificial vs. natural formation"); and (2) the ponding was too
temporary to qualify as "other waters."'
1. The Artificial vs. Natural Formation Theory
The appellate court rejected the district court's "artificial vs.
natural formation" distinction by concluding that the district
court incorrectly construed the regulations to exclude artificially
created waters.' 6 ' The appellate court recognized that the Corps
had claimed jurisdiction over artificial waters in both its regula-
tions and in its subsequent interpretation of the pertinent regula-
tions.' 62  The appellate court maintained that the Corps'
interpretation of its own regulations proved that the Corps in-
tended to exempt from its jurisdiction "only those artificially cre-
ated waters which are currently being used for commercial
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce.
Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1990) (em-
phasis added).
160. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 360.
161. Id. at 359-60. The appellate court noted that the district court was
correct in finding that all waters listed as "other waters" in section 328.3(a)(3)
were naturally created, but the district court erred when it concluded that the
artificially created crystallizers and calcium chloride pits could not be covered by
the section. Id. For the text of section 328.3(a)(3), see supra note 159 and ac-
companying text.
162. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 359-60. The Corps defines "lake," a feature listed
in section 328.3(a)(3), to include artificial waters under 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(b)
(" 'lake' includes 'a standing body of open water created by artificially blocking
or restricting the flow of a river, stream or tidal area.' "). Id.
The Corps' interpretation of section 328.3 regulations support the Corps'
assertion of jurisdiction over a broad range of waters, including artificially cre-
ated waters:
[W]e generally do not consider the following waters to be "waters of
the United States." However, the Corps reserves the right on a case-by-
case basis to determine that a particular waterbody within these catego-
ries of waters is a water of the United States.
(c) Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating and/or diking dry
land to collect and retain water and which are used exclusively for such
purposes as stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, or rice growing.
(e) Waterfilled depressions created in dry land incidental to construc-
tion activity and pits excavated in dry land for the purpose of obtaining
fill, sand or gravel unless and until the construction or excavation operation is
abandoned and the resulting body of water meets the definitions of wa-
ters of the United States (see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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purposes, and that even those waters are subject to such jurisdic-
tion on a 'case-by-case' basis of review."' 63 The appellate court
concluded that because the crystallizers and calcium chloride pits
were not being used for commercial purposes anymore, they were
not exempted from Corps jurisdiction under the regulations. 164
2. The Temporary Water Formation Theory
The appellate court next considered the issue of the tempo-
rary nature of the water formation in the crystallizers and pits.1 6 5
Due to the climate in the San Francisco Bay Area, the crystallizers
and pits fill with water only during the winter rainy season.' 66
The district court had held that the crystallizers and calcium chlo-
ride pits were not "other waters" within the Corps' regulations
because the structures "are in fact dry most of the year."' 167 The
appellate court rejected this reasoning on two grounds: (1) Corps
regulations specifically list two seasonal water features as "other
waters" 168 ; and (2) prior case law finding Corps jurisdiction over
temporary water bodies.169
3. The Connection of the Crystallizers and Pits to Interstate
Commerce
The appellate court next addressed the question of whether
the formations had sufficient connections to interstate commerce
163. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 360.
164. Id. The appellate court further buttressed its conclusion by citing pre-
vious case law upholding Corps jurisdiction under the CWA over artificially cre-
ated waters:
Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (mosquito-control ditch); Stoeco Dev. Ltd. v. Dept.
of the Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (D.N.J. 1988)
(artificially created wetland), appeal dismissed, 879 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir.
1989); United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.Cal. 1987) (same);
Track 12, 618 F. Supp. 448 (same); United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F.
Supp. 483 (D.NJ. 1984) (same), affirmed, 772 F.2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1192, 89 L.Ed.2d 307 (1986).
Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Leslie /, 896 F.2d at 360.
168. Id. The pertinent Corps regulation includes intermittent streams and
playa lakes. Definition of Water of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)
(1990). A playa lake is "a nearly level area at the bottom of a desert basin, some-
times temporarily covered with water." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
951 (2d College ed. 1982).
169. The appellate court cited Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126,
130 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) and United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) as authority for
the proposition that the Corps has jurisdiction over temporary waters.
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to come under the Corps' jurisdiction as "other waters."'1 70 The
appellate court found that the Corps had published criteria for
determining when waters had sufficient ties to interstate com-
merce.171 The use of water by migratory birds was included in
these determining criteria. 172 The appellate court accepted the
Corps' interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA and re-
manded to the district court for a determination of whether the
property had the requisite connections to interstate commerce
based on two appellate court findings: (1) "migratory birds (in-
cluding many protected by Migratory Bird Treaties) and one en-
dangered species may have used the property as habitat" ; and (2)
"[t]he commerce clause power, and thus the [CWA], is broad
enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which
may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
species."173
D. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rymer
The majority opinion in Leslie II was accompanied by an opin-
ion written by Judge Rymer concurring in part and dissenting in
part. 174 Judge Rymer concurred in the majority's holding on the
170. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 360. Under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), the crystalliz-
ers and pits must still qualify as those whose "use, degradation or destruction
. .. could affect interstate or foreign commerce." For the text of section
328.3(a)(3), see supra note 159.
171. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 360. The Corps adopted EPA's (Environmental
Protection Agency) criteria for determining when waters have sufficient ties to
interstate commerce. Id. For a description of these criteria, see infra note 172
and accompanying text.
172. Id. Final rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51
Fed. Reg. 41,206 states in pertinent part:
.... [Wiaters of the United States at 33 CFR 328.3(a)(3) also include
the following waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migra-
tory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species....
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986).
173. Leslie 1I, 896 F.2d at 360. The Ninth Circuit cites Utah v. Marsh, 740
F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Re-
sources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 991-95 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1981) and cites generally Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-36 (1979), for
the proposition that the commerce clause power and CWA are broad enough to
extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to mi-
gratory birds and endangered species. Id.
174. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 361. The majority opinion was written by Circuit
Judge Farris, and joined by Circuit Judge Pregerson. Circuit Judge Rymer con-
curred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 355, 361.
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wetland property stating "the southern portions of Leslie's prop-
erty meet the [CWA] requirements for Corps' jurisdiction."' 75
Judge Rymer disagreed, however, with the majority's treatment of
the crystallizers and pits, concluding that the district court had
correctly determined that the crystallizers and pits were not
"other waters" within the meaning of Corps regulations. 176
Judge Rymer asserted that the majority was correct in its con-
clusion that "the seasonal nature of the ponding is no obstacle to
Corps jurisdiction."'17 7 Judge Rymer, however, distinguished the
instant case from the cases cited by the majority as authority for
that proposition because, in the instant case, there was no hydrolog-
ical connection between any other body of water and the crystalliz-
ers and pits. 178
Judge Rymer concluded that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the CWA extended Corps jurisdiction to waters that are
not "adjacent to bodies of open water," noting that the Supreme
Court had specifically declined to rule on this issue in Riverside. 179
Judge Rymer recognized that Congress has the power under the
commerce clause to regulate wildlife and endangered species but
disagreed that this regulatory power was at issue in this case.' 8 0
175. Id. at 361. The southern portions of Leslie's property were held to be
under Corps jurisdiction because they exhibited wetland characteristics under
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b). For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the southern
portions, see supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
176. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 361 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (referring to 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3)).
177. Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added). The fact that the cycle of ponding created no
hydrological connection with any other water distinguishes the instant case from
Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985) and United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975). Id. For a discussion of
Quivira Mining and Phelps Dodge, see supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Leslie II court's majority treatment of Quivira Mining and
Phelps .Dodge, see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
The dissent noted that nothing in the record showed that water flowed di-
rectly or indirectly from the crystallizers or pits into any other body of water.
Leslie /, 896 F.2d at 361 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
179. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 361. For the Supreme Court's statement in
Riverside declining to address the issue of bodies of water not adjacent to open
bodies of water, see supra note 71 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Riverside, see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
180. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (citing Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979),
and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1976)).
For a discussion of the reasoning behind the majority's reliance on these
two cases, see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of congressional power over migratory birds and endan-
gered species, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Judge Rymer reframed the issue as being whether Congress in-
tended to extend the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA to the
full extent of the Congress' commerce clause power.' 8 ' Accord-
ing to Judge Rymer, there was no evidence that the Corps' regula-
tions, allowing jurisdiction based on migratory and endangered
species habitats alone, were a reasonable interpretation of the
CWA.I 82 Judge Rymer distinguished the Supreme Court's finding
in Riverside of "at least some evidence of the reasonableness" in
the Corps' regulations because Congress had been aware of the
regulations at issue in Riverside and specifically rejected efforts to
change them.'8 3 In the instant case, Congress had not consented
to the Corps' jurisdiction based on migratory birds and endan-
gered species because it had not considered new CWA legislation
since the Corps published the new regulations. 8 4
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Corps Jurisdiction over the Wetland Portion of the
Property
The Ninth Circuit was correct in its conclusion that the
181. Id. The dissent doubted whether it is reasonable for Corps jurisdic-
tion to rest on the fact that migratory birds and endangered species may have
used the waters as a habitat. Where the majority had cited Utah v. Marsh, 740
F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984), as authority for this proposition, the dissent distin-
guished Marsh from the instant case because in Marsh "the lake was used for
several purposes that established a connection to interstate commerce." Les-
lie II, 896 F.2d at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., dissenting). The dissent noted "[iut is
unclear whether the Marsh court would have found a substantial enough effect
[sic] on interstate commerce, and thus Corps'jurisdiction [under the CWA], had
the only connection to interstate commerce been that 'the lake was on flyway of
several species of migratory waterfowl ......."Id. (citing Marsh, 740 F.2d at 803).
182. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 361 n. 1 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
183. Id. The dissent notes that in Riverside:
[T]he Supreme Court held that since the Corps asserted jurisdiction
over adjacent wetlands was brought to the attention of Congress
'through legislation specifically designed to supplant it . . .' and
Congress rejected efforts designed to curb that jurisdiction, that was 'at
least some evidence of the reasonableness of the [Corps']
construction.'
Id. (citation omitted)
184. Id. Judge Rymer reasoned that since the Corps issued new regulations
on November 13, 1986 in order to clarify CWA regulations regarding the section
404 permit program, these regulations were not considered during congres-
sional debates on the Clean Water Act of 1977, and therefore, Congress had not
conceded their reasonableness. Id. at 362. The dissent noted that new regula-
tions (1) "placed the definition of 'waters of the United States' into a new Part
328 of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations" and (2) "stated that 'waters
of the United States' also include areas which are 'or would be' used as a habitat
for migratory birds or endangered species. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)." Leslie H,
896 F.2d at 362.
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southern portions of Leslie's property were wetlands under the
jurisdiction of the Corps. The issue had been settled in many
previous cases' 8 5 and was only before the appellate court because
the district court did not properly distinguish the instant facts
from those of Fort Pierre.'S6 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Les-
lie II from Fort Pierre because in the instant case the Corps was not
solely and directly responsible for creating the wetland conditions
on Leslie's property. 8 7 There are, however, stronger grounds
for distinction. In Fort Pierre, the area claimed by the Corps had
only slight wetland characteristics and was otherwise devoid of
life.""' In contrast, the Leslie property showed stronger wetland
characteristics of the kind that Congress intended to protect.
Congress was concerned with waters that flow in hydrological
cycles and considered wetlands an important part of that cycle.
The Ninth Circuit found that the culverts which connect Leslie's
wetland property to an arm of the San Francisco Bay provided
grounds for jurisdiction. s9 This is a prime illustration of comply-
ing with the congressional mandate requiring protection of hy-
drologically connected waters by preventing pollution at the
source; in the instant case by preventing the destruction of the
culvert's adjacent wetlands.' 90 The appellate court was correct
when it reasoned that how a wetland was created, even if it was
created by the government, is irrelevant to the determination of
Corps jurisdiction. 19'
B. Corps Jurisdiction over the Crystallizers and Pits
The Ninth Circuit's determination that the Corps has juris-
diction over the crystallizers and pits is, however, an unprece-
dented expansion of the Corps' jurisdiction. The appellate
185. For a discussion of cases finding Corps jurisdiction over wetlands and
other hydrologically created waters, see supra notes 55-78 and accompanying
text.
186. For a discussion of Fort Pierre, see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text.
187. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 357-58. For a discussion of the appellate court's
treatment of Fort Pierre, see supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
188. Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d at 466. The only thing living in the polluted water
were cattails and other wetland type vegetation that thrived in stagnant and
often polluted waters. Id.
189. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 358-59.
190. For a discussion of why wetlands are ecologically important to adja-
cent waters, see supra note 57.
191. The authorities cited by the appellate court support that proposition
and are consistent with case law on the subject. For a list of these authorities,
see supra note 152.
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court's analysis is based on an overly broad reading of Congress'
intent with respect to regulating "waters of the United States" as
it applies to the Corps under the CWA. The appellate court
found the crystallizers to be non-hydrologically connected when
describing them as "large, shallow, watertight basins."' 192 Noth-
ing in the record showed that water flowed directly or indirectly
from the crystallizers or pits into any other body of water. 193 Yet
the appellate court supports its finding of jurisdiction with cases
that refer to hydrologically connected waters that are significantly
physically different from the non-hydrologically connected crys-
tallizers and pits.19 4
The Ninth Circuit offers two different interpretations of what
Congress intended to regulate under the CWA. When discussing
the effect of government caused inundation, the court first states
that Congress intended to extend CWA jurisdiction to "any
aquatic features within the reach of the commerce clause
power."' 195 Three paragraphs later the court says "Congress in-
tended to regulate local aquatic ecosystems regardless of their or-
igin."' 96 The two interpretations vary significantly in meaning,
and will be considered separately below.
The phrase "any aquatic feature" means anything taking
place in or on water. 97 The appellate court cites Leslie Salt Co. v.
Froehlke for this interpretation of the CWA's scope.' 98 However,
Froehlke was written at a time when courts where giving broader
meaning to the CWA in order to escape the constraints of the
traditional meaning of the phrase "navigable waters."' 199 The
Froehlke court did not apply the traditional "navigable water" test
when it held that pond water collected by pumping from a neigh-
192. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 355. For a detailed description of the crystalliz-
ers, see supra note 122.
193. Id. at 361 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
194. For a listing of the cases cited by the Ninth Circuit to support its
finding of jurisdiction over the crystallizers and pits, see supra notes 164 & 169
and accompanying text.
195. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 357.
196. Id. at 358.
197. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 123 (2d College ed. 1982).
"Aquatic" is defined as (1) off or in the water, (2) living or growing in or on the
water, or (3) taking place in or on the water. Id.
198. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 357 (citing Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d
742, 755 (9th Cir. 1978)). For a discussion of the proposition held by Froehlke,
see supra note 47 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's reliance
on Froehlke, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of the Corps' traditional meaning of the term "navi-
gable waters," see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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boring bay at the rate of eight to nine billion gallons was subject
to Corps jurisdiction under the CWA, even though the ponds
were not subject to tidal action because of man-made dikes.200
The Froehlke court specifically "express[ed] no opinion on the
outer limits to which the Corps' jurisdiction under the FWPCA
[CWA] might extend.."20 1
Froehlke is consistent with the position that hydrologically
connected waters, even though separated by man-made dikes, are
subject to Corps jurisdiction. To read Froehike as expanding
Corps jurisdiction to any aquatic feature within the commerce
clause is an unwarranted interpretation of the case and congres-
sional intent.20 2
The second view of the Ninth Circuit, that Congress intended
to regulate local aquatic "ecosystems," has greater validity be-
cause this is closer to congressional intent under the CWA. 20 3 An
"ecosystem" considers the ecology of an area as a whole.204 The
cases cited by the appellate court for this "ecosystem" interpreta-
tion of Corps jurisdiction under the CWA: (1) *relate to hydrologi-
cally connected waters; and (2) disregard the origin of the water
body.20 5
When analyzing the situation involving the crystallizers and
pits, however, the Ninth Circuit applied the first, and arguably too
expansive, test applicable to hydrologically connected waters.
200. Froehlke, 578 F.2d at 755.
201. Id. at 756.
202. For the holding in Froehlke, see supra note 47. For a discussion of the
appellate court's reliance on Froehlke, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of congressional intent in enacting the CWA, see supra note 43
and accompanying text.
203. For reference to the Court of Appeals' consideration of the ecosystem
definition, see supra note 196 and accompanying text. For a discussion of con-
gressional intent in enacting the CWA, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
204. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1437 (2d College ed. 1982).
"An ecological community together with its physical environment, considered as
a unit." Id.
205. See Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986)
(traditional navigable lake before and after Corps' construction of dam creates
waters under Corps jurisdiction); United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 188
(4th Cir. 1985) (federal construction of mosquito-control ditch creates waters
subject to ebb and flow of tide), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412, 414 n. 1
(1987); United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169, 1174 (5th Cir. 1981) (tidal
canal connected with interstate waterway), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940 (1981);
Track 12, Inc. v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 618 F. Supp.
448, 449 (D. Minn. 1985) (state and locality construction of highway and sewage
system created wetland under Corps jurisdiction).
For the proposition the Leslie II court cites for each case, see supra note 152
and accompanying text.
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The appellate court focused its analysis on whether the crystalliz-
ers and pits are described by the Corps' regulations as waterbo-
dies over which it asserts jurisdiction. 20 6 The court applied the
"artificial v. natural formations" test and reasoned that the Corps'
own interpretation of its regulations also included artificial waters
with no hydrological connection. 20 7 However, the cases cited by
the appellate court to support the proposition that Corps jurisdic-
tion includes artificial waters are cases where the "waters" are hy-
drologically connected to other waters or wetlands. 20 8
The appellate court also determined that the temporariness
of the water formation in the crystallizers and pits was not a bar to
Corps jurisdiction, but again supported this proposition with
cases dealing exclusively with hydrologically connected waters.209
The appellate court stated it would defer to the Corps' inter-
pretation of the CWA when it was "reasonable and not in conflict
with the expressed intent of Congress" and further when the in-
terpretation did not amount to "a plain error." 210 The court then
delineated the two different interpretations of congressional in-
tent: (1) "any aquatic features within the reach of the commerce
206. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 359-60.
207. Id. The appellate court cited the Corps' interpretation of its regula-
tions which declared, on a case-by-case basis, that artificially created waters in-
cluding lakes, ponds and waterfilled depressions used to collect water or
excavate materials were "waters of the United States." Id. (citing Final Rule for
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217
(1986). These waters cited by the court have no hydrological connection to
other waters.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985) (mosquito-
control ditch subject to ebb and flow of tide); Stoeco Dev., Ltd. v. Dept. of the
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (D.N.J. 1988) (artificially created
wetland), appeal dismissed, 879 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Akers,
651 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (artificially created wetland); Track 12, Inc. v.
District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 618 F. Supp. 448 (D. Minn. 1985)
(artificially created wetland); United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J.
1984) (artificially created wetland), aff'd, 772 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
For a list of cases cited by the Ninth Circuit to support its proposition, see
supra note 164.
209. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 360 (citing Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d
126, 129 (10th Cir. 1985) (lake and arroyo connected to other waters by surface
flooding and groundwater) and United States v. Phelps Dodge, 391 F. Supp.
1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) (water flowing through normally dry arroyo ends up
in public waters)). For a discussion of Quivira Mining and Phelps Dodge, see supra
notes 86-92 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the majority's treatment
of Quivira Mining and Phelps Dodge, see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the dissent's treatment of Quivira Mining and Phelps Dodge, see
supra note 178 and accompanying text.
210. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 357. For a further statement of the court's stan-
dard of review, see supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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clause power"; and (2) "local aquatic ecosystems regardless of
their origin."' 2 1' Nowhere in its analysis of the crystallizers and
pits does the Ninth Circuit actually make a finding that the Corps'
regulations are reasonable interpretations of either characteriza-
tion of congressional intent. Thus, the analysis of the Corps' reg-
ulations under this declared reasonableness standard was never
applied. The appellate court instead focused on distinctions of
artificiality and temporariness that apply to cases involving only
hydrologically connected waters.
A jurisdictional test based on aquatic ecosystems is the cor-
rect test of congressional intent in regulating waters under the
CWA. If the Ninth Circuit had discussed this test, which it itself
had raised, the court would have found little evidence of congres-
sional intent to regulate a body of water under the CWA that was
not hydrologically connected to other waters. 212 Unlike Riverside,
where the Corps' regulations at issue had been debated in Con-
gress and not revoked, the Corps regulations at issue in Les-
lie I & H have not been formally debated in Congress.213 The
dissent in Leslie H raises this issue and is correct in finding no
evidence of reasonableness. The Supreme Court in Riverside ex-
plicitly stated that it did not reach the issue of Corps jurisdiction
over waters not "adjacent to bodies of open water," 21 4 a conclu-
sion the Ninth Circuit affirmatively reaches. The district court
had stated that "land does not become a water of the United
States just because water collects, ponds, and stands on land for a
few days after a rain. '21 5 It is doubtful that this type of water
211. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 357-58. For a statement of the two descriptions,
see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
212. In Riverside, the Supreme Court linked aquatic ecosystems and hydro-
logic cycles when it stated "[p]rotection of aquatic ecosystems, Congress recog-
nized, demanded broad federal authority to control pollution, for '[w]ater moves
in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled
at the source.' " Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-33. For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's analysis of waters based on hydrological connection, see supra notes
69-71 and accompanying text.
213. Leslie II, 896 F.2d at 362 n. 1 (Rymer, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of congressional consent to the Corps' regulations, see supra note 184 and ac-
companying text.
214. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's declining to answer this issue,
see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
215. Leslie 1, 700 F. Supp. at 483. The district court noted that any land
subjected to enough rain will collect water which eventually runs off or perco-
lates into the ground. Id. The appellate court dissent by J. Rymer opined that
the fact that no hydrological connection exists between the crystallizers and pits
and other bodies of water distinguishes the instant case from other cases where
temporary bodies of water were held to be under Corps jurisdiction. Leslie II,
896 F.2d at 361 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
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body was what Congress had intended to be regulated by the
Corps under the CWA. 2 16  Waters that are not hydrologically
connected do not present as compelling an issue for environmen-
tal protection as hydrologically connected waters because their
pollution, destruction or modification does not effect other wa-
ters. The Corps' jurisdiction over these waters rests not on the ill
effects of one body contaminating another, but solely on the det-
rimental effect pollution, destruction or modification will have on
the individual body of water's function in interstate commerce.
The Ninth Circuit found that waters which may provide habitat to
migratory birds and endangered species justify Corps jurisdic-
tion.21 7 However, the court cites cases that uphold general con-
gressional commerce power over endangered species218 and
specific Corps power over waters with several interstate com-
merce connections. 21 9 This author must agree with the statement
of the Tabb court when it expressed "grave doubts that a property
now so used, or seen as an expectant habitat for some migratory
birds, can be declared to be such a nexus to interstate commerce
as to warrant Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction". 220
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of the court's decision in Leslie II, environmental-
ists have a strong position with regards to opposing development
on any land that holds water, even temporarily. This water does
not have to be hydrologically connected with any other water and
216. The Leslie IH court stated that under 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 the
Corps intended to exempt from its jurisdiction only those artificial waters being
used for commercial purposes, and that the crystallizers and pits had not been
used for decades. Leslie 11, 896 F.2d at 360. But is that a reasonable test? Why
should Leslie be able to fill the pits if it was for the commercial purpose of pro-
ducing salt, but not for the commercial purpose of housing or commercial devel-
opment? If the distinction is the ongoing nature of the commercial enterprise,
then how long a lapse is required in the enterprise before the Corps may obtain
jurisdiction?
217. Leslie H, 896 F.2d at 360.
218. Id. (citing Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471
F. Supp. 985, 991-95 (D. Haw. 1979)).
219. Id. (citing Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984)). The
appellate court in Marsh upheld Corps jurisdiction based on the lake's interstate
commerce connection because the lake was used to irrigate crops sold in inter-
state commerce, support a fishery whose products were sold out-of-state, and
provide interstate travelers with recreational opportunities. Marsh, 740 F.2d at
803-05. For a discussion of Marsh, see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
220. Tabb, 715 F. Supp. at 729. For a discussion of Tabb, see supra notes
105-10 and accompanying text.
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could, at the extreme, be found to include almost any puddle on
any land in the United States.
Developers, property owners, and farmers will face uncer-
tainty about the extent of Corps regulations over their property if
the property contains any natural or man-made water formations.
Routine maintenance and development of their land may be sub-
ject to costly and prohibitive Corps permit procedures.
The Army Corps has broad powers of regulation that may be
wielded unevenly. The Corps, an administrative agency with con-
siderable decision making discretion, has the power to decide
what constitutes the appropriate use of vast portions of land in
the United States. As this power is exercised, and its effects on
development are felt, Congress may decide that it did not grant
its total power to regulate "waters of the United States" under the
commerce clause to the Army Corps of Engineers and may legis-
late strict limitations and criteria pertaining to waters subject to
Corps regulation.
Martin S. Lessner
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